

# YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS TOWARD ALBANIA-DOC ALSO MENTIONS-ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT LEADE

Page 1 of 3

Go to page

[View details](#) of this report below.

HARRY S TRUMAN LIBRARY

President's Secretary's Files

PL 87-49  
(11)

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

COPY NO.1  
FOR THE PRESIDENT  
OF THE UNITED STATES

## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

## YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS TOWARD ALBANIA



APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE 2 MAY 89

NIE - 42/1

Published 20 October 1952

*The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff. All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 16 October 1952.*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Title:

YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS TOWARD ALBANIA-DOC ALSO MENTIONS-

# YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS TOWARD ALBANIA-DOC ALSO MENTIONS-ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT LEADE

[View details](#) of this report below.

President's Secretary's Files

~~SECRET~~

## YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS TOWARD ALBANIA

### THE PROBLEM

To review the conclusions of NIE-42\* with respect to Yugoslav intentions.

### ESTIMATE

- The conclusions of NIE-42 pertinent to the present problem are as follows:
  - Resistance activity within Albania, while a troublesome problem for the Hoxha regime, was not an immediate threat.
  - So long as the resistance effort in Albania remained divided and did not receive substantial external aid, the Albanian security forces could probably control it.
  - Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece had conflicting interests in Albania, and each probably preferred the status quo to a change favorable to the others.
- Albanian Government leaders have shown concern over the increase of Yugoslav and other propaganda against the regime. At the middle and lower levels of the party and government, including the security organs, a loss of confidence in the long-term prospects of the regime and an increased sense of personal insecurity appear to have developed.
- Even if the Yugoslavs should succeed in uniting the various Albanian emigre factions, 

At present those forces, though not entirely trustworthy, are under the control of trusted officials, many of whom were trained in the USSR. these forces would revolt only if they became convinced that an insurrection (a) would receive sufficient aid from the outside to insure success, (b) would not result in Yugoslav, Greek, or Italian domination, and (c) would lead to an independent Albania actively supported by the Western Powers.
- The Yugoslavs could overthrow the Hoxha regime if they utilized their own forces or large numbers of Kosovars (an Albanian minority in Yugoslavia) for operations in Albania. Even if only Kosovars were used, the Yugoslavs almost certainly estimate that

\*The Current Situation in Albania with Partic-

# YUGOSLAV INTENTIONS TOWARD ALBANIA-DOC ALSO MENTIONS-ALBANIAN GOVERNMENT LEADE

[View details](#) of this report below.

HARRY S TRUMAN LIBRARY

President's Secretary's Files

~~SECRET~~

2

may estimate that their importance to the West is such that identifiable Yugoslav intervention in Albania would not result in the loss of Western support. However, the Yugoslav leaders probably estimate that identifiable intervention would adversely affect their present favorable relations with the Western Powers, would complicate Yugoslavia's relations with her non-Communist neighbors, and might provoke Soviet or Satellite retaliation.

6. On the other hand, there are advantages for the Yugoslavs in continuing their political pressure against the Albanian regime without directly intervening or deliberately precipitating a coup attempt. By continuing their present course they can promote the predominance of the Yugoslav-supported group within the Albanian emigre movement.

7. The Yugoslavs would almost certainly seize upon any opportunity to establish a pro-Yugoslav regime in Albania if it could be done without incurring serious risk of provoking Western disfavor or Soviet retaliation. [redacted] for the present they will continue to exert political pressure against the Albanian regime without directly intervening or deliberately precipitating a coup attempt.

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)